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Executive Summary
 
In 2010, the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General appointed a senior advisory group to
conduct an independent review of how civilian capacity is provided in the aftermath of con-
flict. The advisory group’s report on civilian capacity (CIVCAP) resulted in the UN and its
member states embarking on a global effort to reshape the way that civilian expertise is
mobilized in crisis and post-conflict settings. 
CIVCAP seeks to enlist a broader set of partners in the provision of this civilian assistance,
and in particular to work with the Global South as important providers. The UN CIVCAP
approach rests on the assumptions that Global South partners are willing and able to bring
expertise from their own development and transition experiences, that there will be
resources available to enable this, and that the multilateral machinery for post-conflict inter-
national assistance will be able to re-engineer itself to better absorb that support.
The CIVCAP initiative has emerged against the backdrop of a much broader and longer-
term dynamic wherein major actors of the Global South have continued to grow signifi-
cantly as providers of bilateral assistance. Long-standing South–South cooperation pro-
grammes have expanded in line with the growing economic interests and foreign policy
aspirations of these countries. National policy frameworks, systems and institutions are
evolving to manage the growth in scale and complexity of these technical cooperation pro-
grammes, a trajectory which seems likely to continue in the coming years.
The CIVCAP Network countries (Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russia, South Africa and
Turkey) have been tracking the CIVCAP process and have been actively engaged in consul-
tations at the UN and regional levels. Each of these countries approaches CIVCAP from a
slightly different perspective and each has varying interests and ambitions. In general, the
principles and broad approach of CIVCAP– such as its focus on greater inclusion and rec-
ognition of the importance of South–South knowledge transfer and its advocacy of nation-
ally-led approaches over supply-side dominance – are welcomed by the countries. There is
an interest in finding ways to ensure that their national expertise and civilian experts can be
harnessed for CIVCAP.
On the other hand, these countries also face a range of challenges and constraints in their
engagement with CIVCAP. Several of them have had limited experience in providing civil-
ian specialists in crisis settings. For others, there is more experience, but they are grappling
with how to strengthen their systems for deploying personnel or for upscaling their civilian
assistance activities. There are domestic challenges in some countries, ranging from incen-
tives structures, resources and legislation, to pre-deployment training or coordination.
There is also a continuing lack of clarity about how their national capacities will engage with
multilateral actors. There are questions about what sorts of specific civilian expertise the
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UN and others are seeking in practice. How will requests be made to governments? Under
what terms and conditions and status will their personnel work? Some partners are seeking
further discussions on what resources or funding mechanisms might be available to support
CIVCAP contributions and how this may work.
The partner countries recognize that CIVCAP is a work in progress and that much remains
to be elaborated. However, many of them may not be in a position to further clarify or
develop their capabilities and systems for supporting multilateral CIVCAP deployments
(e.g. putting in place training, policies, rostering) until that clarity begins to emerge. There
is a high likelihood that, in the short to medium term, most of the partner countries will
provide civilian experts in crisis and post-conflict settings primarily through bilateral
arrangements. In the meantime, more can be done on the domestic level to raise awareness
of CIVCAP among national stakeholders, in government and beyond, and to work on elim-
inating potential obstacles or bottlenecks to CIVCAP deployments, whether through mul-
tilateral or bilateral channels.
For most of the countries studied, a far wider set of activities (including trainings, study
tours, workshops etc.) serve as important mechanisms for supporting civilian capacity
development in both development settings and in post-conflict and crisis settings. The nar-
row concept of CIVCAP – with its primary focus on the problem of in-country technical
assistance – is seen as limited, and as failing to recognize the wider contributions being made
in supporting civilian capacity under existing bilateral cooperation programmes.
Chapter Six of this synthesis report presents ten general findings or observations drawn
from the country case studies. These observations can perhaps feed into discussions among
CIVCAP Network countries about key issues that they could monitor, or engage with as
the Network continues its work in cooperation with governments and the UN in support
of the CIVCAP initiative. The baseline observations from this study are as follows:
1. There is a good level of general support for CIVCAP among the partners.
2. CIVCAP needs to move quickly from the theoretical to the practical.
3. The UN CIVCAP concept is not sufficiently broad to capture the CIVCAP-related
activities of the countries studied.
4. Countries are likely to prefer an ‘on request’ model to engaging with the UN CIVCAP
initiative, until mechanisms for government-provided personnel have been clearly artic-
ulated.
5. Bilateral assistance is likely to remain the predominant approach.
6. The CIVCAP community is small, and strong formal as well as informal networks are
needed, internationally and domestically.
7. The need for strengthened coordination and deployment support systems is recognized,
but technocratic tools for managing larger scales of civilian capacity deployment are not
yet a high priority.
8. New funding for encouraging CIVCAP through multilateral institutions could gener-
ate support from smaller countries with limited financial resources, but not from the
larger players.
9. Trilateral cooperation arrangements are potentially important mechanisms for building
CIVCAP relationships, but are ad hoc.
10. Regional organizations are not yet playing a significant role in CIVCAP, although the Afri-
can Union has already embarked on a process to make greater use of CIVCAP in future.
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1. Introduction
 
During crisis and in the aftermath of conflict, deploying the right civilian capacities can be essen-
tial to building peace, to facilitating fragile social and economic transitions and to reinforcing
national and local institutions. The 
 
Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Armed Conflict
 
 (CIV-
CAP) process, launched in 2010, is an international effort to strengthen the thinking around,
and the machinery for, providing effective civilian assistance in crisis and post-conflict settings.
 
The CIVCAP Network
 
In support of the CIVCAP process, a new network of research partners has been formed
and is working to find opportunities for strengthening and supporting CIVCAP. The 
 
Civil-
ian Capacity Network
 
 is a research partnership centred on prominent countries of the Glo-
bal South. It brings together national institutes with expertise in peacebuilding research.
The aim is for these research partners to work cooperatively alongside governments, the UN
and other partners to realize common interests on the CIVCAP agenda. The CIVCAP Net-
work currently consists of analytical and research institutes in Brazil, China, India, Indone-
sia, Russia, South Africa and Turkey, and is supported by Norway.
 
The Baseline Study
 
In June 2012, CIVCAP Network partners agreed to produce a joint ‘baseline’ (or starting-
point) study on the state of play with CIVCAP among the partner countries. To contrib-
ute to the present report, national case studies were produced for Brazil, India, Indonesia,
Russia, South Africa and Turkey.
 
1
 
 This synthesis report draws extensively on the indivi-
 
CIVCAP Network Partners (2013)
 
• African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (South Africa)
• Cairo Center for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (Egypt)
• Centre for Strategic and International Studies (Indonesia)
• Igarapé Institute (Brazil)
• Institute of Contemporary International Studies (Russia)
• International Institute for Strategic Studies (China)
• Istanbul Policy Centre, Sabanci University (Turkey)
• Norwegian Institute for International Affairs (Norway)
• United Services Institution of India (India)
 
1. In addition to those mentioned, Réseau francophone de recherche sur les opérations de paix (ROP) contributed a case
study of a Francophone country, namely Burkina Faso.
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dual case studies as inputs to the baseline. All partners have been encouraged to publish
their country case studies.
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 This report and the case studies are the CIVCAP Network’s
first formal contribution to the dialogue on the role of the Global South in providing civil-
ian expertise in crisis and post-conflict settings. The case studies also present valuable
research about national experiences with providing civilian assistance beyond crisis and
post-conflict settings.
This report will inform a first substantive discussion among all CIVCAP Network partners
and their governmental counterparts at a seminar in Brasilia on 28–29 November 2012. At
that meeting, CIVCAP Network members will help validate the observations and findings
from the study. To this end, the present report presents a synthesis of the 2012 ‘baseline’
understanding of national approaches to CIVCAP. The report introduces the CIVCAP
agenda and the perceptions of CIVCAP by the Network partners. It outlines national moti-
vations and interests in CIVCAP, as well as the national frameworks that underpin engage-
ment with CIVCAP. The study presents findings on the civilian assistance activities of each
of the countries, and the national policies, systems and resources for administering these.
Thereby the study seeks to explore partners’ current approaches to CIVCAP and to identify
issues for the CIVCAP Network to continue to engage with in future.
 
Defining CIVCAP
 
The CIVCAP agenda builds on familiar concepts in international cooperation, but the
CIVCAP construct itself is a relatively new one in international peacekeeping and peace-
building parlance. Although governments have for decades deployed civilian personnel
abroad through technical cooperation and other programmes, the 2011 Senior Advisory
Group’s Report on 
 
Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict
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 focused attention on the
particular challenges of deploying civilian expertise in crisis-affected countries and in sup-
port of post-conflict peacebuilding.
For the purposes of this study, the following working definition for ‘CIVCAP’ was agreed
at the outset of the research:
 
2. As appropriate, the individual studies will also be published online with the joint study on the CIVCAP Network web-
site: http://www.nupi.no/Virksomheten/Forskningsprogram/Civilian-Capacity.
3. The original report can be found at: http://www.civcapreview.org (The report was transmitted in full to the UN General
Assembly in February 2011 under UN document symbol A/65/747–S/2011/85).
 
CIVCAP Working Definition
 
The term ‘civilian capacity’ (CIVCAP) refers to non-uniformed civilian individuals or
groups deployed overseas to crisis or post-conflict settings by (or coordinated
through) their respective governments. The term includes personnel deployed
through bilateral cooperation programmes as well as those deployed through the
United Nations, regional organizations or other intergovernmental organizations. It
includes civilian capacity deployed from the public sector or private sectors, includ-
ing academia and civil society organizations that is in some way ‘coordinated’ under
government auspices.
  1. Introduction 3
 
The key features of the CIVCAP definition are:
• non-uniformed, civilian personnel
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• deployed by, or otherwise coordinated under the auspices of, governments
• deployed to crisis or post-conflict settings
The term ‘civilian assistance’ (rather than CIVCAP) is used in this report to denote provi-
sion of civilian capacities in countries not affected by crisis. In order to assess the potential
for CIVCAP provision in future, and to understand the underlying national approaches,
this study has drawn extensively on wider experiences of civilian assistance in non-CIVCAP
settings.
The above definition of ‘CIVCAP’ does not preclude the possibility that the CIVCAP Net-
work may decide to use a broader interpretation in future. This may well be necessary as the
CIVCAP concept, in its current usage, refers primarily to a problem analysis seen from the
viewpoint of the United Nations – in particular, the twin challenges the UN faces in finding
sufficient national civilian capacity in host countries and the right international civilian spe-
cialists for timely deployment in conflict and crisis settings.
As discussed in this study, several countries take a broader view of what CIVCAP might
entail, in terms of the types of assistance provided, and the need to look at civilian capacity
developments beyond the confines of the aftermath of armed conflict.
 
4. This definition follows the UN approach and defines civilian personnel as distinct from military and police personnel.
An interesting alternative approach is that of the European Union (EU), which distinguishes between military and civil-
ian crisis management, and where the police are regarded as part of civilian crisis management.
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2. A New Approach to Civilian Capacity
 
The CIVCAP Problem Statement
 
Released in early 2011, the independent report of the Senior Advisory Group on 
 
Civilian
Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict
 
 set in motion an international effort to tackle systemic
challenges in civilian capacity mobilization. Existing approaches to mobilizing specialized
technical expertise had repeatedly been found wanting in post-conflict settings.
A central feature of the CIVCAP agenda has been the frank recognition that in the after-
math of armed conflict, or in other crises, traditional civilian technical assistance pro-
grammes and international peace operations have struggled to identify and deploy enough
appropriately experienced and skilled civilian specialists. Technical assistance programmes
have been slow to mobilize the level of highly specialized capacities required, and have
struggled to respond quickly in the absence of clearly stated demands from countries in con-
flict and governments in crisis. Large international peace missions deployed by the UN and
other international institutions often carry high vacancy rates and also have been unable to
source sufficient numbers of specialist personnel in key peacebuilding sectors, particularly
in core governance and institution-building fields.
The 2011 CIVCAP Report identified several important challenges faced by the UN and its
partners in providing CIVCAP in the aftermath of conflict:
• identifying and engaging appropriate 
 
national expertise
 
 for peacebuilding from within
the crisis-affected state and from its diaspora
•
 
rebalancing supply-driven CIVCAP approaches
 
 in favour of clearly articulated and genu-
ine national demand from recipients
• identifying and 
 
quickly mobilizing the right international expertise
 
, and in particular from
the Global South.
• opening up long-standing institutional practices in mobilizing civilian personnel so as
to embrace a 
 
faster and more flexible approach to mobilizing civilian specialists
 
 for work in
crisis and post-conflict settings.
There was also an important recognition that specialized capacities, particularly in areas
such as governance, public policy and government institution/systems support, exist prima-
rily within national government structures and not in international organizations.
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The approach to date
 
With approval from the UN General Assembly
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 in May 2012, the UN and its partners
launched a broad programme of consultation and analysis to develop CIVCAP systems for
the future. Although coordination of this international effort is centred on the UN Secre-
tariat, CIVCAP is being pursued as a global partnership with UN member states, as well as
UN and intergovernmental organizations and non-government actors.
The UN and its partners are working to identify CIVCAP improvements along three main
lines:
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•
 
national ownership
 
: strengthening host country ownership and leadership of transition
processes and supporting new methods for mobilizing the host country’s own national
capacities in support of peacebuilding;
•
 
partnerships and expertise
 
: building stronger partnerships for timely supply of high- qual-
ity CIVCAP experts, in particular encouraging greater Global South engagement in pro-
viding CIVCAP expertise in key peacebuilding sectors;
•
 
greater institutional flexibility within the UN system
 
: improvements within the UN sys-
tem to make it more flexible and responsive to national requests for CIVCAP specialists
and to foster greater openness to new methods of deploying individual experts and
groups of experts offered by member states and other partners.
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The UN Secretariat has limited resources for CIVCAP implementation and is actively look-
ing to its partners, including the CIVCAP Network, to help identify new approaches in the
above areas. Through this study, the CIVCAP Network is focusing on the CIVCAP part-
nership agenda and in particular the issues around mobilizing CIVCAP from the Global
South.
 
Assumptions
 
The UN’s CIVCAP partnership agenda
 
8
 
 hinges on several important assumptions about
the future dynamics of CIVCAP supply and demand. These assumptions are either explic-
itly stated in the Independent Report and subsequent reports of the Secretary-General, or
can be implied from those documents. Important CIVCAP assumptions include:
1. that major actors of the Global South, as well as smaller developing countries, are gen-
uinely interested in, committed to, and have available for deployment the specialist
expertise required in crisis and post-conflict settings;
 
5. UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/66/255 of 15 May 2012.
6. The Report of the Secretary-General on Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict, 15 August 2012 (A/67/312-S/
2012/645) laid out three main headings for the CIVCAP work plan.
7. For example, the UN is looking at revising ‘onboarding’ arrangements to facilitate the deployment of personnel
deployed by governments, intergovernmental or quasi government channels in support of specific and specialized UN
mandate tasks for limited durations. This includes: (i) secondment of individuals from governments to UN posts or as
UN Volunteers; (ii) mobilizing civilian capabilities (particularly teams) sourced from member states under ‘letters of
assist’ or memorandum-of-understanding arrangements, and; (iii) an expansion of the ‘experts on mission’ system cur-
rently used for ‘uniformed civilians’ (police, corrections personnel) to a broader set of categories of ‘Government-Pro-
vided Personnel’ sourced from member states.
8. See sections III and V of the 2012 Report of the Secretary-General for an articulation of the partnership approach being
implemented by the UN Secretariat (A/67/312-S/2012/645).
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2. that CIVCAP partners have important domestic transitional and peacebuilding experi-
ences, as well as specialist civilian personnel that they are willing and able to provide to
help transfer that knowledge;
3. that CIVCAP partners are in fact interested in deploying their capacities either through,
or in close coordination with, multilateral institutions like the UN, rather than focusing
on bilateral cooperation arrangements;
4. that greater CIVCAP cooperation between the UN and the Global South is a way to
forge closer relationships and mutual understanding, and thereby more deeply involve
these member states in the work of the UN;
5. that resources will be available and can be mobilized in support of enhanced CIVCAP
participation, whether bilaterally or through forms of triangular cooperation;
6. that the UN, regional organizations and other intergovernmental bodies are able and
willing to open their institutional practices to support new ways of mobilizing and
deploying specialists in, through or alongside UN operations.
These assumptions reveal much about the expectations, aspirations and interests of the UN
with respect to the CIVCAP partnership agenda. Through an analysis of how key emerging
actors in the Global South are engaging with CIVCAP, this study explores the validity of
some of these assumptions.
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3. Network Partner Views of CIVCAP
Nations of the Global South are already engaged in UN peace operations at significant levels,
as well as providing civilian assistance bilaterally. More than 60 per cent of the total interna-
tional civilian staff in UN peace missions come from Global South countries. More than 80
per cent of the CIVCAP-type positions requested from governments to fill specialized justice
and corrections functions have been provided by the Global South, in particular by smaller
developing countries.9 The next chapters explore the perspectives and experiences of some
major actors in the Global South – Brazil, India, Indonesia, Russia, South Africa and Turkey
– and review their national experiences and aspirations for raising their level of civilian capac-
ity provision in crisis and post-conflict settings, through bilateral and multilateral channels.
The term ‘CIVCAP’ (as used by the Senior Advisory Group report and by the UN) is a rel-
atively new one in the international discourse on peacebuilding and peacekeeping. Yet, the
concept is not entirely unfamiliar to partner governments. The CIVCAP agenda builds
upon long-standing experience in providing international technical assistance, including
through extensive South–South cooperation activities. National understanding of CIVCAP
is informed by each country’s experiences with technical cooperation, as well as their inter-
national peacekeeping and peacebuilding mission experiences and broader foreign policy
interests and ambitions.
The process of domestic and international familiarization with the CIVCAP concept has
been underway since 2010. At the UN General Assembly, the issue has been advanced slowly
and deliberately, so that countries can become more familiar with the concept before signif-
icant changes are proposed. The General Assembly has requested the UN Secretary-General
to undertake extensive consultations on CIVCAP prior to submitting specific proposals.
Both the Senior Advisory Group’s review of civilian capacities in the aftermath of conflict
and the subsequent regional consultations on CIVCAP and CAPMATCH10 have contrib-
uted to raising awareness on the issue. Since the UN regional meetings held in Indonesia
(March 2012), South Africa (July 2012) and Morocco (September 2012), there has been a
significant interest in CIVCAP from a range of countries beyond the CIVCAP Network
itself. Egypt, for example, is keenly engaging in CIVCAP and has identified available exper-
tise on CAPMATCH. Many other countries outside the CIVCAP Network, among them
Burkina Faso11 and Bangladesh, have taken an active interest in CIVCAP as a potential ave-
9. See for example Annex One
10. CAPMATCH was launched by the United Nations in September 2012 as a service established to facilitate the matching
of requests for assistance with suppliers of civilian capacity. Its web portal is at https://capmatch.dfs.un.org/Capmatch/
11. A valuable study of Burkina Faso and its engagement with CIVCAP was produced by Réseau francophone de recherche sur
les opérations de paix (ROP) as an adjunct to the CIVCAP Network’s baseline study; it clearly reveals the interest of a small,
internationalist developing country in the CIVCAP agenda. For more on ROP see: http://www.operationspaix.net.
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nue for deploying personnel in international missions, building on their experiences with
deploying uniformed civilian personnel like police or corrections officers.
In this context, the CIVCAP concept continues to undergo a ‘socialization’ process in the
national and international contexts. Several partner countries are still finding their positions
on the CIVCAP agenda introduced in the UN. Other countries, however, have been quick
to engage in the issue and to begin to shape the CIVCAP agenda. For most countries, a
common challenge has been finding ways to communicate the CIVCAP agenda to the
broad range of relevant national stakeholders (beyond the ministries of foreign affairs
(MFAs) or other peak coordinating bodies), most of which are as yet largely unaware of the
concept and the global processes underway.
CIVCAP appears to be viewed by most of the countries studied in this report primarily
through the prism of development cooperation, and as an extension of their bilateral tech-
nical cooperation activities, which have long provided civilian assistance overseas. The start-
ing point for those looking at CIVCAP from the perspective of bilateral cooperation can be
quite distinct from those viewing the same concept from, for example, the position of deliv-
ering improved UN peacebuilding efforts.
CIVCAP is not only seen from a technical cooperation perspective but also is informed by
each country’s experience with international peace operations. Each of the countries exam-
ined here has been a significant actor in international peace operations through the UN
and/or regional entities for more than a decade, in some cases for more than 50 years. This
engagement has primarily been within the UN peacekeeping framework and through con-
tributions of military and police personnel. Table 1 shows current contributions to UN
peace operations (peacekeeping operations and special political missions) by CIVCAP Net-
work members as of September 2012. Annex 1 provides additional information on civilian
personnel to UN field missions as staff and as government-provided experts on mission.
Annex 2 shows the deployment levels of all categories of personnel (military, police and
civilians) for all CIVCAP Network partners from 2010 to 2012.
Table 1. Personnel deployed in UN field missions, by category, as of 
31   August 2012a
a. Figures for uniformed personnel (troops, military experts on mission, and police) contributions are taken from the
DPKO Website. Figures for international civilian personnel in UN peacekeeping missions and special political missions
have been provided by the Department of Field Support.
Country Military Police Civiliansb
b. UN civilian staffing figures show that while CIVCAP Network personnel numbers are overall relatively small, that there
is a very large number of countries participating. Well over 60% of the personnel currently in UN missions are from the
Global South, as are 80% of government-provided ‘experts on mission’.
Brazil 2191 24 34
China 1834 83 20
India 7066 1038 232
Indonesia 1824 169 7
Russia 72 21 94
South Africa 2041 71 63
Turkey 297 146 12
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CIVCAP is also viewed through the broader prism of the foreign policy interests and ambi-
tions of the partner countries. For countries such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Africa
and Turkey, CIVCAP is also seen in terms of their foreign policies and their growing soft
power, and their roles as influential global players in an increasingly multipolar world. CIV-
CAP also has the potential to bolster their roles and reputations as major regional actors by
responding to potential CIVCAP needs regionally.
There is no single ‘Global South position’ or CIVCAP Network position on CIVCAP.
Each country comes to CIVCAP from a different starting point, with different national
experiences and differing ambitions. For example, in the case of India, CIVCAP engage-
ment is enmeshed within a more fundamental debate within the Indian decision-making
community about the country’s future participation in UN peace operations and how to
strengthen international peacekeeping capacities. This is a debate taking place within the
context of a wider discussion about India’s foreign and security policy. Turkey views CIV-
CAP within its wider development cooperation framework and solidarity with countries in
crisis, as well as an additional option for soft-power influence. In the case of Indonesia, the
broader civilian dimension is a less politically sensitive entry point for dealing with conflict
management in its region. For South Africa and Brazil, regional considerations weigh as
heavily as the global ones as these countries look into new initiatives such as CIVCAP.
An interesting point to emerge across several case studies and interviews is that the growing
interest in the CIVCAP agenda is due in part to the increasing demand or requests from the
UN Secretariat to the partner countries to contribute civilian experts to UN peace opera-
tions, and more recently to the CAPMATCH tool. The majority of the studied countries
have provided information about generic civilian expertise in one or more of the five prior-
itized areas – basic safety and security, justice, inclusive political processes, core government
functionality, and economic revitalization – for the CAPMATCH database.
All countries have noted that demand for their capacities is on the rise. Most of them indi-
cated that they are receiving growing number of bilateral requests for assistance from neigh-
bouring countries or other countries of the Global South. There is also greater recognition
domestically that the civilian capacities which each of the countries has to offer is increas-
ingly valuable on the global stage. Many of these capacities are built upon successful domes-
tic policies, programmes and experiences and there is an interest in sharing these with oth-
ers. A further factor contributing to increased interest in the CIVCAP agenda is
membership on the Peacebuilding Commission.12 Bangladesh is one such example, where
interest in CIVCAP has grown since the launch of the 2011 Report on CIVCAP. Most
recently, the government has expressed interest in identifying relevant training courses for
potential civilian experts to be deployed to peace operations.
The partner countries have also expressed some lack of clarity as to the purpose of the UN’s
CIVCAP agenda, particularly with regard to CAPMATCH. It is not clear to some whether
the process is more about actually facilitating and strengthening national efforts to deploy
12. Of the CIVCAP Network partners, currently Brazil, China, India, Indonesia and the Russian Federation are members
of the Peacebuilding Commission Organizational Committee; South Africa played a prominent role as co-chair of the
2010 Peacebuilding Commission Review.
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civilian experts, or if it is simply about getting countries to deposit information on the CAP-
MATCH platform. A recurring point made by the partner countries is the need for the UN
Secretariat to play a more proactive role in ensuring that CAPMATCH can lead to real
‘matches’, whereas the UN Secretariat has been at pains to explain that it does not have the
resources to play such a role. Almost all of the case studies noted that greater clarity in the
articulation of needed civilian expertise would be helpful, as would the development of clearer
frameworks for deploying government-provided personnel with specialized expertise or other
civilian capacities to UN operations. For some of the countries, the availability of sources of
funding for these multilateral contributions is also seen as important to future success.
Notwithstanding the overall positive and supportive positions towards the CIVCAP agenda,
interest and ambitions vary among the partner countries. The following is a brief analysis of
the views and positioning of each of the studied countries on the CIVCAP to date:
Brazil
Brazil is supportive of the CIVCAP agenda, and has recent experience in deploying civilian
experts in post-conflict/peacebuilding contexts. In 2012, Brazil became a co-sponsor of the
CIVCAP Resolution in the UN General Assembly, and the Foreign Minister has several
times mentioned Brazil’s interest in providing Brazilian CIVCAP to UN peace missions.
These reflect a deeper interest in Brazilian foreign policy concerning the interdependence
between security and development. The new interest in CIVCAP support to the multilat-
eral system has been due in part to requests from the UN for Brazil to participate in CIV-
CAP, as well as Brazil’s experience as a lead actor in Haiti and the growing role of the UN
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) as a civilian peacebuilding effort.
India
India has been a supporter of the CIVCAP agenda in the UN General Assembly and Secu-
rity Council. Through its extensive peacekeeping engagement, India is familiar with the
underlying rationale for the CIVCAP agenda, and has seen CIVCAP as an avenue for
improving the capability of peacekeeping missions. India has sought to ensure greater rec-
ognition of the linkages between peacebuilding and peacekeeping, and to ensure that the
contributions of peacekeepers as early peacebuilders is recognized and not diminished.
India has noted that national ownership should be at the core of a demand- (and not sup-
ply-) driven CIVCAP agenda. India is committed to considering requests for government-
provided personnel from the UN. Yet, it also expects the UN to develop transparent and
clearly defined frameworks for utilizing member-state capacities, which should include a
greater focus on secondment of government officials and more formalized mechanisms for
soliciting requests for assistance.
Indonesia
Indonesia is a firm supporter of CIVCAP at the global and regional levels. This has included
strong leadership on the issue through its Permanent Mission in New York. Together with
Canada, it serves as co-chair of the Consultative Group for the Civilian Capacity Review.
In March 2012, Indonesia hosted a regional consultation on CIVCAP in Bali. It co-spon-
sored the General Assembly resolution and hosted a CAPMATCH consultation of the
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international civilian training and rostering community at its Permanent Mission in New
York on 14 June 2012.13 Indonesia sees CIVCAP as resonating well with its own views on
peacebuilding and crisis management, and consonant with the ASEAN preference for non-
confrontational forms of peace operations. It views CIVCAP as an opportunity to export
Indonesia’s positive domestic experiences in support of others.
Russia
Russia has been generally supportive of CIVCAP. As a relatively new donor, Russia is inter-
ested is ensuring that taxpayer resources are spent effectively, and for the best possible
results. However international aid and assistance programmes have not always been effective
enough. Russia looks for at least indirect political benefits from the assistance it provides.
Russia is seeking access to new markets and other business opportunities for its national
companies. From a broader perspective, Russia has less interest in funding those interna-
tional assistance programmes that are seen as pursuing highly ‘Western’ approaches and
agendas. Russia is interested the greater organized involvement of its citizens in international
assistance activities, and is working to identify opportunities to do so.
South Africa
South Africa is supportive of CIVCAP and, by hosting an African regional conference in
Pretoria on 19–20 July 2012, has positioned itself as somewhat of an advocate in the region.
In the peace operations context, South Africa has been actively engaged in the development
of the civilian component of the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC)
Standby Arrangement and the civilian dimension of the African Standby Force (ASF). CIV-
CAP is viewed as an avenue for mobilizing and deploying civilian expertise from South
Africa and for complementing its bilateral cooperation programme under the African
Renaissance Fund (ARF) and the recently established South African Development Partner-
ship Agency (SADPA). South Africa, like Brazil, is a strong example of how the epistemic
community plays a vital role in advancing concepts onto domestic policy agendas.
Turkey
Turkey has provided low-profile support for the CIVCAP agenda. Turkey views its civilian
assistance activities as part of its ‘global diplomacy efforts’ and ‘development cooperation
efforts’. It sees strong inter-linkages between its civilian capacities efforts and its foreign pol-
icy goals. As a primarily bilateral actor, Turkey has not indicated any short-term plans for
providing substantial CIVCAP assistance through the UN, but it has deployed civilian
capacities with NATO in Afghanistan and the EU in the Balkans.
13. CIVCAP 2012: Laying Concrete Foundations, NUPI Policy Brief 9/2012 at http://english.nupi.no/Publications/Policy-
Briefs/Policy-Briefs
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4. Review of National Experiences
This section explores the experiences of CIVCAP Network partners. It draws extensively on
the six case studies conducted on Brazil, India, Indonesia, Russia, South Africa and Turkey.
These case studies explored the normative and policy frameworks that underpin national
approaches to CIVCAP, and reviewed national experiences in providing civilian assistance
and future aspirations of these countries as regards CIVCAP.
Several common experiences emerged across the case studies:
1. The term ‘civilian capacity’ as used by the case-study countries refers to a wider set of
activities than merely deploying technical experts abroad. It includes capacity-develop-
ment activities such as short-term missions, trainings, scholarships, and study tours, etc.
2. Each of the countries has substantial experience providing civilian assistance to other
countries. Although the bulk of this experience has been in stable development settings,
support is increasingly being provided also to countries in crisis or in the aftermath of
conflict. Such support has been provided primarily through bilateral South–South
cooperation programmes.
3. All of the countries subscribe explicitly to South–South cooperation principles14 as par-
amount considerations in their overseas cooperation activities. The general approach of
CIVCAP appears to resonate with these as well as with the foreign-policy priorities and
international cooperation principles for each of the countries.
4. All of the countries appear interested in expanding their CIVCAP provision in peace-
building/peacekeeping contexts through either bilateral and/or multilateral channels.
Currently, most appear to prioritize bilateral cooperation modalities over regional and
multilateral options.
5. All of the countries have some form of policy and/or institutional change process under-
way that is designed to strengthen their national policies, institutions and capacities for
technical cooperation, including providing civilian assistance.
6. In each of the countries, there are very few institutions and personnel familiar with the
CIVCAP agenda and the processes of overseas deployments, rarely extending beyond
one or two coordinating agencies.
14. Although principles are not officially codified or enumerated, several guiding approaches are frequently invoked, includ-
ing: respect for sovereignty and national ownership, demand-driven engagement with another country as equals, transfer
of knowledge, based on solidarity and/or mutual benefit between countries, with a view to strengthening local capacity
and developing national resources.
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Otherwise, each country has different approaches to CIVCAP. These national approaches
are deeply rooted in the national policy and institutional contexts, as well as the current and
historical experience with international cooperation programmes and specific experiences in
providing civilian expertise. The remainder of this chapter provides a synopsis of the niche
national capacities of each country as well as a review of the foreign policy, international
cooperation and peacekeeping firmaments on which CIVCAP engagement is being built.
Niche civilian capacities
Brazil
Brazil’s primary fields of technical cooperation interest have included tropical agriculture and
tropical health, vocational training, energy, environment and to a lesser extent public secu-
rity and education. These sectors draw heavily on Brazil’s own good practices in national
development. For future support to UN missions, possible niche areas for Brazil might
include corrections, wider policing and community-violence reduction.15
India
India has a potentially vast reservoir of civilian capacity across a broad spectrum of civilian
tasks. In the fields of democratization and electoral support, Indian experts have worked
abroad with electoral bodies, including in support of UN entities and the Commonwealth
Secretariat. India has an enormous national technical-vocational training capacity, with a
network of more than 1,000 industrial training institutes. The country has a considerable
national disaster relief capacity, with an interest in overseas engagement operationally16 as
well as through advisory services.17 There is significant potential to draw on policing capac-
ity (uniformed and non-uniformed) to provide technical assistance abroad, including in
post-conflict settings. India can draw on a large private-sector capacity, some of which is
already being tapped through initiatives such as Consultancy Development Centre.
Indonesia
Indonesia’s interests in providing CIVCAP appear limited at present to government-related
capacities and there has not yet been a canvassing of the non-governmental sector. Although
Indonesia’s short-term capacity to provide civilian expertise is limited, there is genuine
ambition for the medium term. Indonesia has commenced a policy effort to better define
its technical cooperation priorities, wherein seven ‘flagship’ programmes have been pro-
posed to government for approval. Of these, several of these priorities are of real relevance
to CIVCAP, including: capacity building for democracy; disaster risk reduction; capacity
building for good governance; and also a programme of targeted capacity building for Pal-
estinian development with a focus on the viability of the future Palestinian state.
15. Since 2005, the Brazilian NGO Viva Rio has provided capacities to advise on and help deliver community-violence
reduction programmes in Haiti. Brazil has also provided a small number of police experts to MINUSTAH.
16. For example, India maintains 10 battalions on standby for disaster response, and 180 Search and Rescue (SAR) teams
(14 of which on 30 minute-notice standby agreements); and an Indian SAR team was sent to Fukushima, Japan, for
rescue and recovery operations in 2011.
17. India maintains state- and central-level centres of excellence in disaster risk management.
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Russia
Russia has so far focused mostly on providing funds for international aid and assistance,
with less focus on international deployment (beyond humanitarian and emergency
responses such as through EMERCOM). Russia has focused on health, food security and
education. It has been donating funds bilaterally and multilaterally, and providing training
in recipient countries as well as in Russia, but has not been active in providing significant
numbers of personnel for international missions. Russia has the potential for providing
civilian capacity in security-related fields, education and medicine. Russia has enough expe-
rienced experts to assist administrative and economic reforms abroad.
South Africa
South Africa has provided civilian capacities such as observer and electoral support mis-
sions, mediation and policing support. It has also focused on democracy promotion, anti-
corruption and truth and reconciliation processes. There is also a considerable capacity both
within and outside government on human rights, rule-of-law and transitional justice issues,
including prominent advocacy and legal expertise. A challenge for South Africa’s new devel-
opment partnership office will be to reach out to the many untapped sources of expertise in
government, in civil society organizations and the private sector. South Africa is also aware
that its national capacity reserves are limited and often cannot be spared from domestic pri-
orities for extended periods.
Turkey
Turkey’s main focus to date has been on providing bilateral civilian expertise in the basic
services cluster such as construction, infrastructure and agriculture as well as cultural activ-
ities. However, in Afghanistan and to some extent Somalia, Turkish support has broadened.
Turkey has become a significant provider of assistance in Somalia, and is increasingly coor-
dinating its efforts with the international community as others deploy into Somalia. In
Somalia, as elsewhere, Turkey has used a blend of Turkish NGOs, official government
assistance, security sector actors and religious groups, as well as private business interests.
Foreign policy and international cooperation underpinnings
This section explores some the foreign policy, international cooperation experiences that are
foundations on which emerging national approaches to CIVCAP are being built. Each of
the case-study countries has pursued some form of international cooperation effort for
many years, albeit varying considerably in scope and scale. Table 2 provides a summary of
those cooperation programmes.
To varying degrees and in different ways, each of the countries has some experience of
deploying civilian capacity abroad in technical assistance roles. Bilateral cooperation pro-
grammes have been the main instruments for this. Most of the countries studied have
deployed limited numbers of civilian experts and/or other forms of civilian support in post-
conflict, peacebuilding or transition settings. For example, some have deployed civil service
or quasi-governmental experts abroad, as in the case of Indian and Turkish support in
Afghanistan, and South African electoral expertise in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC), as well as truth and reconciliation advisers in Nepal. In other cases, non-
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governmental national capacity has been leveraged as well (for example, Brazilian NGO
expertise in community-violence reduction in Haiti) although largely outside of govern-
mental frameworks.
These civilian deployment experiences have not been stand-alone activities. Civilian capac-
ity efforts appear to be deeply embedded in the foreign policy and international cooperation
objectives of these countries.
Brazil
Brazil is a long-standing proponent of multilateralism and balances this with its national
aspirations of leveraging its regional-power status into a greater global role. Brazil’s interna-
tional cooperation effort supports these foreign policy interests. Its foreign policy principles
are enshrined in Article 4 of the Constitution, with explicit references to peaceful settlement
of disputes and cooperation among peoples, sovereign equality, self-determination and non-
intervention. Brazil is asserting a stronger role in international groupings and institutions,
including the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), the UN, the Group of Twenty
(G20), the trilateral India–Brazil–South Africa (IBSA) forum and the Brazil-Russia-India-
China-South Africa (BRICS) grouping. In the UN General Assembly, Brazil has become an
active player in peacekeeping and peacebuilding issues. Brazil’s term as an elected member
of the Council from 2010 to 2011 coincided with that of Turkey (2009–10), and of South
Africa and India (2011–12). This period saw sustained Council engagement on questions
of post-conflict peacebuilding and the launch of the CIVCAP process.
Brazil’s international cooperation efforts began in the 1950s and increased markedly in the
1970s and 1980s. A second surge in international cooperation commenced from 2003.
Between 2005 and 2009, Brazil contributed USD 1.6 billion in international cooperation
activities, and the number of its country partners increased from 21 to 56. In this period,
the programme began to tilt away from its strong regional focus, with a new emphasis on
Africa and, to a lesser extent, the Middle East. In 2010, for the first time Africa overtook
Latin America and Caribbean as the largest recipient region of Brazilian technical coopera-
tion assistance. Today, Brazil provides assistance to 23 countries deemed Fragile States
under either World Bank and/or OECD definitions.
The type of cooperation programming by Brazil has gradually become more ambitious.
There have been tentative steps toward longer-term, more integrated technical assistance
projects,18 although these remain the exception. There has also been a significant move
away from multilateral channels: more than 90 per cent of its technical cooperation projects
are now bilateral. Brazil’s civilian experts working with technical cooperation (referred to as
‘technicians’) typically deploy on short-term missions only, and are sent bilaterally. Haiti,
Guinea Bissau and Timor Leste are the main post-conflict peacebuilding settings that have
seen the deployment of Brazilian technical experts.19 The Brazilian government has not
deployed civilian personnel in post-conflict settings through UN or regional organizations.
18. Recently, ‘structuring projects’ have been utilized: these integrate multiple activities within larger-scale, longer-term
projects, and have required the deployment of project management teams.
19. Although short-term civilian missions have been sent to Afghanistan, DRC, Lebanon, Liberia and Sudan.
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Brazilian individuals (e.g. UN staff members) are recruited/deployed without direct govern-
ment coordination or facilitation.20
India
India maintains a robust bilateral cooperation agenda alongside its strong foreign policy posi-
tions in multilateral arenas. At the UN, India has been active in many policy spheres, includ-
ing as a major player in shaping policy within the Non-aligned Movement in the General
Assembly as well as in UN field operations, the latter primarily through its large peacekeeping
commitments.21 India has also been a high-profile member of the Peacebuilding Commission
and has worked to engineer better linkages between the peacekeeping and peacebuilding dia-
logues in the UN. This year, India completes its term as a non-permanent member of the UN
Security Council from 2011–12, during which time it has promoted peacekeeping and pea-
cebuilding linkages and has engaged in the UN CIVCAP process. India has long maintained
an active international cooperation programme as one component of a comprehensive for-
eign policy agenda. India has long adhered to the principles of South–South cooperation in
its multilateral and bilateral activities. It has traditionally focused on providing bilateral assis-
tance and ensuring that its international cooperation provides mutual benefits to India and
the partner countries in the spirit of South–South cooperation.
Since 1964, India has implemented its flagship international cooperation programme known
as the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme. Managed by the
Ministry of External Affairs, ITEC has grown considerably over the past ten years. ITEC has
six components: training in India;1 project services in recipient countries; deputation of
Indian experts; study tours (usually visits of two to three weeks); donations of in-kind equip-
ment/assistance; disaster relief assistance. ITEC has remained a predominantly bilateral
cooperation programme but has occasionally been used to support intergovernmental coop-
eration programmes.22 ITEC and other Indian programmes such as the Special Common-
wealth African Assistance Programme now provide assistance to more than 150 countries.
Alongside ITEC, India also maintains technical assistance capacities in its Electoral Com-
mission, National Institute of Disaster Management, Consultancy Development Centre
etc., as well as through the Special Commonwealth African Assistance Programme. With
the emergence of India’s new institution for managing its development cooperation pro-
gramme, the Development Partnership Agency, further strengthening of its international
cooperation programme is anticipated, which will help to integrate the multiple sources of
overseas assistance provided by India.23
20. For most countries, however, there is government support and lobbying for senior-level UN appointments, including
in senior field positions on civilian contracts.
21. India is currently the third largest troop contributor to UN peacekeeping and has had more than 150,000 peacekeepers
serving in operations since the 1950s.
22. ITEC has provided assistance through or in support of several inter-governmental initiatives, including Commonwealth
Secretariat, UNIDO, G77 and G15 initiatives.
23. See for example http://www.mea.gov.in/development-partnership-administration.htm
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Indonesia
Indonesia’s foreign policy ambitions have grown steadily as the country has moved towards
middle-income status. Indonesia is increasingly keen to draw on its successful domestic
development and transition experiences in support of others abroad, primarily in Southeast
Asia. Indonesia has a strong vision of itself as an exporter of important development expe-
riences, including in managing political transitions, democracy promotion, security sector
reform, as well as in national and subnational peacebuilding, as in its experience with Aceh.
Indonesia would like to be in a position to respond to the increasing requests for civilian
capacity, and to concretely engage with CIVCAP.
Indonesia frames its civilian capacity activities as an element of its technical cooperation and
South–South cooperation. Over the last two years, the government has worked on articulat-
ing a policy document – ‘Grand Design and Blueprint on South–South Cooperation and
Triangular Cooperation’ – which, among other things, would serve as the national guidelines
for deploying civilian capacities. This draft policy document is currently awaiting executive
approval to be passed into law. Indonesia’s international cooperation programme has focused
largely on training and workshops within Southeast Asia. The country wants to begin export-
ing its own technical knowledge rather than being viewed as a recipient of assistance. Its tech-
nical cooperation (kerjasama teknik) programme was established in 1981 to share Indonesian
experiences and knowledge with fellow developing countries. Indonesia has consistently pro-
vided modest amounts of technical assistance to a small number of partners, primarily in
Southeast Asia. Indonesia is still in the process of developing a comprehensive international
cooperation policy. As part of this effort, seven flagship programmes for technical assistance
are under development, several of which may be of real relevance to CIVCAP.24
Russia
In the last decade, Russia has transitioned from being an aid recipient to becoming a donor.
In 2006, a draft policy, Concept of Russia’s Participation in International Development
Assistance, was approved by the government, and was endorsed by the president in 2007.25
The focus is on fulfilling Russia’s wider foreign policy and economic interests: strengthen-
ing Russia’s international position and credibility; stabilizing socioeconomic and political
conditions in partner countries; establishing a belt of good-neighbourliness; preventing the
emergence of potential focal points of tension and conflict, primarily in the regions neigh-
bouring Russia; and creating a favourable external environment for the country’s own
development. Economic interests have been stronger influencing factors than political or
foreign policy agendas. According to Deputy Finance Minister Sergey Storcak, ‘develop-
ment of poor countries favours an increase of the consumption of goods produced in the
donor countries’.
24. Several of these future flagship programmes may be of direct relevance to CIVCAP: community empowerment, capacity
building for democracy, disaster risk reduction, capacity building for good governance, and capacity building for Pales-
tinian development with focus on viability of the future Palestinian state. The selection of these flagship programmes
has been based on the following criteria: best practices and wide implementation in Indonesia, successful adoption in
other developing countries, significant impact and contribution for developing South–South cooperation.
25. The policy document is available at http://www.minfin.ru/common/img/uploaded/library/…/concept_eng.pdf
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Since it became a donor in 2005, Russia has steadily increased its overseas contributions
from USD 100 million to an estimated 500 million in 2012. While initially channelling its
contributions primarily through multilateral frameworks, Russia has increasingly expressed
a preference for bilateral channels, on the grounds that the international organizations do
not reflect Russian perspectives, but instead reflect Western-centric concepts and views.
Russia’s priority aid recipients are its neighbours and countries that belong to its former
sphere of influence. Sub-Saharan Africa is an emerging region of interest.
South Africa
The promotion of peace and stability is a core tenet of South Africa’s foreign policy, with a
particular focus on promoting stability within the African continent. In multilateral forums
(including as a non-permanent member of the Security Council in 2007–08 and again in
2011–12) South Africa has sought to represent African interests on the global stage. South
Africa has been a proud exporter of its domestic experiences in political, security sector and
other reforms since the end of Apartheid, as well as its well-known experience with truth
and reconciliation and transitional justice.
South Africa has maintained international cooperation programmes since the late 1960s. In
the post-Apartheid era, the programme underwent a major overhaul, guided in large part
by government commitment to its African Renaissance policy, which emphasizes African
solutions for African challenges, and the pursuit of a stable, just and equitable continent.
South Africa’s foreign policy and international cooperation approach is anchored on this
commitment to the African region and its sub-regions.
Since 2001, South Africa’s primary instrument for supporting overseas cooperation has
been the African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund (ARF). The ARF is a
means to implement South Africa’s international cooperation priorities, which include the
promotion of democracy and good governance, conflict prevention, peace and stability as
well as humanitarian assistance, capacity development and longer-term development. The
ARF is more of a multilateral and less of a loan/credit-focused mechanism than the coun-
try’s previous international cooperation financing instruments. This enables South Africa
to support more than just bilateral government-to-government cooperation. Accordingly,
the ARF has been used to support regional and international programmes as well as bilateral
activities and as a mechanism for not only South African support to partners but also to
enable third-country ‘triangular cooperation’.26 A broader development cooperation man-
agement entity – the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) – has been
established in 2012.
Turkey
Over the past two decades, Turkey has steadily built a comprehensive and proactive foreign
policy that balances political and economic strategic interests with humanitarian motiva-
tions. Its foreign policy pursues a commitment to international peace and security, partic-
ularly with its neighbours but also much more broadly. Turkey has promoted a vision of
26. For example, ARF is used for South African funding to third countries, such as Cuban doctors to Sierra Leone, but the
ARF can also serve as a modality for receiving donor funding to support South African activities abroad.
20 Paul Keating and Sharon Wiharta
itself as a successful, moderate and secular Islamic state and as a bridge between East and
West. Like the other case-study countries, Turkey has utilized both bilateral and multilat-
eral mechanisms to expand its global profile and has been active in the UN Security Council
(2009–10), the G20 and in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).
Turkey’s international cooperation is guided by six foreign-affairs objectives: a balance
between security and freedom, ‘zero problems’ with neighbouring countries, proactive
peace diplomacy, strong global relations, active involvement in international issues, and
cooperation with international organizations. Its assistance to partner countries, particu-
larly those in crisis, is often described as part of a solidarity approach. Turkey commenced
its official development assistance programme in 1985. In the past two decades, but partic-
ularly since 2003, Turkey has steadily expanded its assistance to countries beyond the tra-
ditional focus on its immediate region and countries with which it has ethnic, cultural, lin-
guistic and religious bonds. Turkey’s assistance programmes have remained very bilateral in
focus, but have expanded significantly in geographical scope and scale.27 Turkey quite flu-
idly draws on its capacities in the public as well as the private sectors (including NGOs, reli-
gious organizations, business community).28
National systems and structures for technical cooperation / 
civilian assistance
This section examines how national systems, organizational structures and policy frame-
works are evolving and influencing the ways the countries studied look at CIVCAP.
From the available data, most of the countries studied have tended to deploy civilian experts
under bilateral technical assistance agreements, and generally on short-term deployments.
The number of nationals deployed to UN field missions has been relatively small, ad hoc
and has not been through proactive efforts of government. To date, most countries have
therefore not needed a centralized coordinating structure or the other tools that might be
required to service a significantly upscale demand for civilian expertise (rosters, standard-
ized training, etc.). However, the case studies also show that because the range of civilian
expertise deployed is quite broad, and is ‘offered’ by various government ministries, agen-
cies and at times civil society organizations or the private sector, the absence of a centralized
structure has made it difficult to maintain a comprehensive catalogue of civilian deploy-
ments or to build up a repository of learning from technical assistance experiences.
Several partner countries are looking into deploying greater numbers of civilian experts in
post-conflict settings in a more predictable and coordinated fashion. Although some of
these processes appear to be organic and nationally-driven, others indicate a more ‘reactive’
process: global developments like the UN’s CIVCAP and related CAPMATCH processes,
27. From an early focus in the mid-1980s on a small number of partners in the Sahel and its immediate region, Turkey
refocused in the 1990s to early 2000s on the Balkans, on emerging CIS countries with historical and ethnic/cultural ties
to Turkey and on greater engagement with regional countries. Since 2002, in Afghanistan, Turkish assistance has been
channelled through its provincial reconstruction teams (in support of ISAF) and its bilateral cooperation programme.
In 2005, Turkey launched its ‘opening up to Africa’ policy, which expanded its development cooperation in sub-
Saharan Africa.
28. The Somalia famine in 2011 brought a major humanitarian response from the Turkish government, businesses, charities
and individuals.
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including regional consultations where the UN has asked countries to take-stock and
present their national civilian capacities, appear to have kick-started national discussions
and reviews of how they have engaged and how they might engage. Moreover, all of the
Network partner countries have contributed to the pilot phase of the UN’s CAPMATCH
tool; their role in CAPMATCH is likely to impact or necessitate a re-evaluation of the need
for some kind of centralized structure or mechanism.
As the level of technical cooperation has increased, a majority of the countries find that
problems in terms of programme implementation, coordination, budgets and evaluation
processes arise. Several countries are either in the process of establishing dedicated develop-
ment agencies, which would have relative funding autonomy and would serve as focal
points on civilian capacity issues; or they are planning to do so.
Policies and Institutional Frameworks for CIVCAP
This section outlines the institutional arrangements in place or emerging for managing
technical assistance in the countries studied. Table 3 presents an overview of some of the
policies and institutional arrangements in place.
Table 3. Summary of policy and organizational arrangements related to civilian 
assistance/ CIVCAP
Country
Foreign or technical 
cooperation underpinnings
Specific CIVCAP 
policies Institutional Arrangements
Brazil Foreign policy, Constitution MFA is main focal point:
general coordination of Inter-
national Action to Fight against 
Hunger (CG-Fome) for humani-
tarian assistance issues, and 
Brazilian Cooperation Agency 
(ABC) for technical cooperation 
issues.
India Technical cooperation policy MEA is main focal point:
Development Partnership 
Administration (DPA) was set up 
in 2012. Ministry of Home 
Affairs is domestic focal point.
Indonesia Grand Design and Blueprint 
on South–South Cooperation 
and Triangular Cooperation
Possible guidelines 
drawing from Grand 
Design Policy
Desire to establish dedicated 
coordinating body: bureau 
within MFA or a stand-alone 
agency
Russia Development Assistance 
Concept Note
MFA proposal to establish 
Russian Agency for International 
Development (RAID)
South Africa Ubuntu: White Paper on 
Foreign Policy
Under development 
by NOCPM by 
DIRCO
South Africa Development 
Partnership Agency (SADPA)
Turkey Foreign and development 
policies
Prime Minister’s Office, with 
support from relevant ministries
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The partner countries do not yet have in place policies explicitly related to CIVCAP, but
the contours are emerging in formal statements including at the UN. The policy instru-
ments that guide the governments’ decision-making processes for CIVCAP are nested in
their broader development cooperation and foreign policy frameworks, described above.
For instance, several of the partners align their technical cooperation principles with the
general principles of South–South cooperation as a demand-driven engagement with
another country through the transfer of knowledge, based on solidarity, to strengthen local
capacity and developing national resources. In terms of these principles, the provision of
civilian assistance is often viewed as a transfer of knowledge.
A common element in the decision-making systems of all partner countries is the relatively
limited number of actors involved. All indicated that their MFAs are the focal points for
civilian capacities, and most of the coordinating bodies sit in that ministry, even if a majority
of the stakeholders may be outside the diplomatic corps. However, given the likelihood that
the specialist capabilities required for CIVCAP are likely to come from line ministries rather
than coordinating agencies, it appears increasingly important for a wider set of actors in part-
ner countries to be aware of the CIVCAP process and its parameters as these become clearer.
Brazil
Brazil deploys civilian experts in the context of its humanitarian assistance and technical
cooperation activities, both of which are coordinated by the MFA, albeit through separate
offices. In cases where there perhaps might be greater national interest, the Office of the
President steps in. The General Coordination of International Action to Fight against Hun-
ger (CG-Fome) is the lead entity within the MFA on humanitarian assistance issues, while
the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) is the lead on technical cooperation issues. These
two bodies are the only entities within the MFA that have some discretionary power and
lines of funding. Despite the existence of CG-Fome and ABC, and their explicit coordina-
tion mandates, a significant portion of the country’s technical cooperation and humanitar-
ian activities are carried out by NGOs, municipalities and other domestic actors, bypassing
the coordination mechanisms. As Brazil’s engagement in CIVCAP continues to grow,
efforts are underway to assess what systems might be needed to improve civilian deploy-
ment, such as providing pre-deployment training for deployed civilian personnel, especially
from the federal level.
India
In 2012, India set up its Development Partnership Administration (DPA), which is headed
by an Additional Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), and aims to bring
together all the relevant stakeholders involved in foreign aid and development activities
within the MEA. It has a total budget of USD 15 billion over the next five years. It will
administer both the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) and the Special
Commonwealth African Assistance (SCAAP) programmes: these have expanded in terms of
scope of activities and in geographic spread, which are the mainstay avenues for India’s
bilateral civilian-capacity initiatives.
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Indonesia
Despite its clear ambitions and articulations for stepping up the deployment of civilian
capacities, Indonesia has not yet established a permanent central policy coordinating body
to oversee the implementation of technical cooperation initiatives. Two options are cur-
rently being discussed. The one is to establish of a bureau under one of the key ministries
– the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of State Secretariat, the Ministry of Finance, or
the National Development Planning Agency – similar to the models adopted by India and
South Africa. The second involves creating a new agency with a specific function of man-
aging international cooperation with developing countries, akin to the Japan International
Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) and
the Agency for Brazilian Cooperation. There has also been an initiative for the Ministry of
Social Welfare to act as a national coordinator to consolidate potential actors to contribute
to CIVCAP as well as to raise awareness about CIVCAP to potential contributing agencies/
institutions in Indonesia. However, since an initial meeting held in mid-2012, there has
been little movement in that regard.
Russia
Russia’s Development Assistance Concept Note outlines procedures and basic principles of
establishing a national system of international development assistance. The action plan,
adopted in 2007 and originally set for implementation between 2008 and 2010, has
included legal regulation, effectiveness and monitoring, and management and realization of
institutional changes. An Interagency Working Group was tasked with implementing the
plan, but has done so only partially. The legal basis for institutional frameworks was estab-
lished, but the scope of responsibilities for the various involved governmental agencies
remains unresolved.
South Africa
South Africa is the only partner country currently developing a policy on civilian participa-
tion in peace operations. The National Office for the Coordination of Peace Missions
(NOCPM) within the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO)
plays the lead role in the development of the policy. The policy aims to provide better guid-
ance on enhancing the country’s participation in the African Standby Force, as well as other
multilateral frameworks. The policy under development would, for instance, define modal-
ities of deployments of civilians in varying bilateral, triangular and multilateral arrange-
ments. The specific policy for civilian capacities is part of a wider effort by the government
to achieve more coherent implementation of its foreign policy that is centred on managing
and resolving the continent’s conflicts. The emphasis on national civilian capacities is in
part a reflection of the fact that South Africa has directed its efforts in support of sub-
regional (SADC) and regional (AU) actors, who have been grappling with these issues.
DIRCO is the main ministry with overall responsibility for South Africa’s engagement in
post-conflict settings. The newly established South African Development Partnership
Agency (SADPA), a dedicated agency for national aid and development, falls under the
remit of DIRCO. The creation of SADPA, which will administer the African Renaissance
and International Cooperation Fund, is an important first step in moving the country’s
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development aid strategy beyond financial assistance. It shows the growing recognition of
the relevance of a technical cooperation programme that draws upon civilian capacities. It
also recognizes that a more holistic and comprehensive approach would entail a greater mix
of actors, among different government departments and stakeholders, and require a more
robust and institutionalized coordination efforts. SADPA is envisaged to coordinate the rel-
evant stakeholders – the Parliament, Department of Finance, the President’s Office, and the
South African Reserve Bank. While strategic clarity has improved, it is not clear whether
the country’s breadth of national capacity is being tapped, or whether domestic stakeholders
are sufficiently aware of the opportunities for providing civilian assistance.
Turkey
The Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA), set up in 1992,
has implemented Turkey’s technical and South–South cooperation activities. However, it
does not hold decision-making powers or budgetary control. Currently, decisions regarding
CIVCAP are made by the Office of the Prime Minister, and by senior cabinet posts at the
Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Development, Defence, Education and Health. TIKA’s pro-
grammes and activities are funded by a central budget, by special project-specific funds
appropriated by the Prime Minister’s Office, funds from other line ministries, and funds
from international commitments. Increasingly, it seems likely the Ministry of Development
will assume a larger role in guiding the work of TIKA. In general, TIKA does not deploy
its own personnel (even though the staff have expertise in the niche sectors of health, agri-
culture and construction) other than maintaining small administrative and liaison offices in
countries where there is a significant programme. Occasionally TIKA staff will be seconded
or deployed, for short periods and only for large projects. TIKA does not have institution-
alized rules and regulations for deployment, pre-deployment training, in-country support,
or post-deployment monitoring and evaluation. These processes are ad hoc and depend on
the sending entity in question. Although the Turkish experience in Afghanistan has led to
the development of well-advanced mechanisms both pre- and post-deployment, it is
unclear if these can now be taken up more broadly.
[start kap]
5. Issues, Challenges and Opportunities
The case studies give rise to a range of questions and considerations regarding the Global
South’s interactions with CIVCAP.
Broader conceptualization of CIVCAP
The CIVCAP concept focuses primarily on the need of the UN, as a deploying entity, to
mobilize the right blend of civilian personnel in the right timeframes. Seen from the per-
spective of the countries studied, however, their interest in and conceptualization of CIV-
CAP seems considerably broader. They include long- and short-term training programmes,
study tours or exchanges as well as short-term expert missions (in addition to longer-term
deployments), but most have had less focus on long-term bilateral deployments of person-
nel in conflict-affected countries.29 The starting point for the UN is the recognition that
the quality and quantity of in-country support is insufficient, and is imbalanced in favour
of a supply-driven approach from a too limited number of countries.
The countries studied appear to focus on leveraging their national experiences to support
partners in later stages of post-conflict situations, and are more focused on activities that
support long-term development and transition. As such, these countries may be less
inclined to provide civilian personnel to countries in immediate crisis or in the immediate
aftermath of conflict, preferring instead to focus on longer-term peacebuilding engagement,
through multilateral or bilateral channels. None of the countries studied has yet developed
specific policies focused on working in crisis settings per se. The focus appears to be on long-
term bilateral relationships, irrespective of whether the countries happen to be in crisis.
Bilateral preferences
For each of the countries studied, there appears to be a clear policy preference for bilateral
cooperation in the provision of CIVCAP. This is not unlike the case for many actors work-
ing in international cooperation, and this higher priority for bilateral action does not
exclude working with multilateral institutions as well. Countries may feel a legitimate inter-
est in achieving a good level of national visibility from these international cooperation pro-
grammes, and bilateral cooperation is often designed explicitly to strengthen relations
between recipient and provider countries. These are not seen as ‘aid’ programmes, and
South–South cooperation is viewed as a mutually beneficial partnership between develop-
ing countries. By contrast, multilateral arrangements bring transaction costs that can
diminish national visibility and introduce a third party into activities intended to build
bilateral relations. In addition, it is not clear that either multilateral institutions or the rel-
29. Turkey and India are the notable examples in the situations of Afghanistan and Somalia.
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evant regional organizations have yet prepared themselves to absorb the significantly
increased capacities that could be provided by the Global South.30
The need for clear demand-side requirements
The case studies have indicated that, as regards bilateral cooperation, it has been relatively
easy for countries to obtain clear requirements for assistance from recipient countries.
Whether the requests come to their embassies in the recipient countries or from political
contacts during ministerial or head of state visits, the systems for receiving these require-
ments appear to work relatively effectively. This is contrasted with the confusion that some
countries have expressed about whether and how requests will be received through CIV-
CAP, and whether formal requests for support from the UN (e.g. for specialist capacities to
support a peace mission) will be solicited through CAPMATCH, or will come directly from
the UN through a different procedure. This in part reflects some continuing dissonance
over the role of CAPMATCH, as to whether it is to be a proactive ‘match-making’ service,
a mechanism for formally soliciting support, or a repository of requests for and offers of
assistance (both in principle and actual) that are then transacted outside of CAPMATCH.
The UN Secretariat has repeatedly clarified that it does not have the resources for running
CAPMATCH as a proactive brokering service; however, several countries have continued
to indicate that unless there can be a proactive ‘guiding hand’, it is unclear how much CAP-
MATCH will be used.
Modalities for multilateral deployment
Several countries have indicated that their ability to commit greater resources in support of
UN field missions is constrained by the lack of knowledge about how the UN solicits gov-
ernment-provided personnel and how the onboarding process works. At regional consulta-
tions and in bilateral dialogue some countries have requested the UN to articulate clearly
its procedures for soliciting government-provided personnel from member states. Some
have proposed that a civilian capacity contributing country (CCC) mechanism be estab-
lished, similar to the existing UN modalities for troop-contributing countries and for
police-contributing countries.31 It is argued that such a mechanism could enhance transpar-
ency, and that such a system is needed before some countries can be in a position to develop
their own procedures for handling government-provided personnel requests, or to make
concrete offers of support. The UN Secretariat is working to elaborate workable modalities
for receiving such government-provided personnel, and proposals will be made in the com-
ing year.32
Few of the countries studied appeared to have easy access to data on their nationals serving
in UN field missions. This is primarily because direct recruitment has remained the main
mechanism for the staffing of civilian positions in UN field missions. The countries studied
have comparatively few civilian personnel deployed with the UN (see table in Annex 1 for
30. Unlike, for example, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or the European Union, which
have much clearer interests and established modalities for utilizing the capacities of their member states.
31. For example, formal requests to all governments through notes verbales, or solicitations for Letters of Assist, that request
support for government-provided personnel or other capacities based loosely on the current Force Generation / Police
Generation processes used by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.
32. See in particular Section IV (B) of the Secretary-General’s 2012 Report on CIVCAP (A/67/312-S/2012/645).
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the largest nationalities of international civilian personnel in UN field missions). Those per-
sonnel have almost invariably been recruited directly into the UN system as short-term or
long-term staff: their recruitment has not been the result of offers of national capacity pro-
vision through an official process. There is no reason to believe that the current direct
recruitment system will undergo any significant shift away from the UN’s current open
recruitment model. The opportunity for significant and structured expansion of the num-
bers of government-sponsored personnel appears to be in the ‘experts on mission’ category
of UN personnel.33 These government-provided personnel are already being mobilized in
the justice and corrections sectors, and are likely to expand into other areas. Already in the
government-provided personnel category, more than 80 per cent of the personnel currently
deployed are from the Global South, although – notably – none of these are from the coun-
tries studied. This makes it even more important for the UN to elaborate further its plans
for engaging government-provided personnel in missions. The African Union, which pur-
sues a similar direct recruitment model, may encounter similar challenges, although it draws
its candidates from only one continent.
Partnership arrangements
The case studies reveal that all countries reviewed have worked with triangular cooperation
arrangements in multiple forms. South Africa, for example, has worked with funding from
Germany to support the DRC,34 while also using the ARF to finance Cuban doctors work-
ing in Sierra Leone. South Africa’s ARF is explicitly designed to provide an avenue for third-
party financing to receive funds from a donor to support South African work abroad, and
to enable South Africa to support third countries in providing assistance. Brazil, India and
Turkey have each worked with the United Nations Development Programme to extend
their South–South cooperation with recipient countries. In the case of India, electoral
experts have been deployed under an agreement with UNDP35, while Brazil and Turkey
have both used the UNDP presence to expand or enable aspects of their South–South coop-
eration programmes.36
Although all partner countries have significant resources of their own, there appears to be a
general openness to triangular support arrangements where these can bring niche resources
to bear, or provide a funding mechanism or administrative modality that had not existed
bilaterally, or if these can help broker new relationships. However, it is also recognized as
likely to be more administratively complicated than bilateral activities. For smaller coun-
33. This category provides the existing framework for mobilizing significant levels of civilian staffing, including for individ-
ual police officers in UN peace missions.
34. For example, the German GIZ and South Africa for example have cooperated to establish a five year trilateral coopera-
tion fund that supports South African initiatives in Africa, and has included several projects in the DRC focused post-
conflict support, police oversight and anti-corruption work.
35. In October 2012, the Election Commission of India and the UNDP signed an MOU for cooperation in election man-
agement under which it is envisaged UNDP will support the deployment of IEC expertise to support electoral processes
abroad.
36. Brazil has worked with the UNDP Country Office in Brazil to use UNDP administrative mechanisms to support the
deployment of Brazilian experts and the provision of funds in some of its South–South projects. The UNDP Country
Office in Turkey has provided capacity support to the Turkish MFA and TIKKA to support South–South cooperation.
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tries, with less capacity to administer a bilateral cooperation programme, the option of
working with multilateral entities can prove valuable.37
Public–private partnerships
Several of the case studies have shown that private-sector interests can be an important com-
ponent of CIVCAP. For example, Turkey has demonstrated in Somalia a relatively com-
prehensive approach to combining the work of private entities (religious, academic, non-
governmental organizations, businesses) and that of the Turkish government, and high-
level delegations of government and interest groups have travelled together to visit the
country. The India and South Africa case studies indicate there is a real possibility to reach
into and to mobilize professional services (for example legal or consultancy services) from
the private sector. In the case of South Africa, private contractor companies might even be
used in a ‘managing contractor’- type model to deliver some CIVCAP-related services. Rus-
sia has had considerable success in competing for civilian contracts with UN peacekeeping.
Russian commercial companies have worked to develop specialized niches for providing
goods and services for UN missions. In 2011, the total volume of contracts for Russian
companies was USD 382 million, or 14 per cent of the total UN procurement within the
peacekeeping budget. Some 99 per cent of these contracts were for civilian air-lift (air cargo)
contracts. The Indonesia government has expressed the ambition to harness the potential
of NGOs such as Muhammidya as key elements in its national CIVCAP ‘toolkit’.
The challenges of providing CIVCAP at scale
Deploying ‘scaled-up’ levels of civilian capacity brings new challenges. With the exception
of Turkey’s and India’s contributions of civilian expertise in Afghanistan, none of the other
countries studied have yet deployed civilian personnel to countries in crisis or to post-con-
flict countries on a large enough scale for them to become fully aware of all the inhibiting
factors or challenges that accompany long-term, large-scale CIVCAP deployments. Most
national deployments through bilateral technical assistance programmes have been rela-
tively short-term, or on a very small scale and for specific, short-term tasks. That stands in
contrast to the longer tours of duty expected of, for example, personnel serving as experts
with UN missions.38
Several of the partner countries have now experienced or have started contemplating the
challenges that face all countries deploying significant numbers of civilians over long dis-
tances, for lengthy tours of duty in crisis-affected countries. Already some of the adminis-
trative challenges that come with longer-term deployments are being tackled with, such as
back-stopping of domestic duties, pension preservation, family benefits and remuneration.
37. The example of the IGAD-UNDP twinning and mentoring initiative in South Sudan, whereby Ethiopia, Kenya and
Uganda have sent 164 civil servants from the partner countries and paired them with their counterparts across the civil
service in South Sudan, has become a high-profile example of cooperation between a sub-regional entity, South Sudan
and the UN. Initial studies indicate that the project is cost-effective and is strongly owned. See e.g. Kristoffer N. Tarp
and Frederik R. Rosén, ‘South Sudan: a New Model for Civilian Capacity in Post-Conflict Settings’,  Journal of Peace-
building & Statebuilding 6 (2) (2011).
38. The average tour of duty for a UN ‘expert on mission’ is generally expected to be for a minimum of one year. A sustained
commitment from a member state would see several of those one-year minimum rotations. For groups of experts
deployed together, this could mean multiple rotating deployments of five to ten personnel for one year at a time, over
three to four years.
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In addition, for larger numbers of people deploying for longer periods, important systems
are needed for selection and preparation and training of those personnel, not least because
some experts may not have been exposed to international work or hardship conditions. Also
issues of in-field logistical support, duty of care, and risk management have started to sur-
face, as they do in all countries deploying personnel abroad, and are being dealt with.
Where national cooperation programmes are scaling up, there has been recognition that
planning and coordination institutions may need to be strengthened, in order to manage
the increasing volume of requests but also to manage domestic constituencies.
Several country case studies have indicated that the lack of specific legislation and policy
frameworks could be an inhibiting factor for scaling up CIVCAP engagement. An equally
important challenge to the CIVCAP enterprise is the issue of financing. To date, the fund-
ing mechanisms and budget lines have been limited to actual programmes and activities,
and do not appear to cover all of the standing costs associated with a system for the ongoing
deployment of CIVCAP. Dealing with how to finance or fund national CIVCAP efforts
will be central to the sustainability of the efforts. Some hope that CAPMATCH could
prove a useful tool for facilitating or ‘matching’ trilateral cooperation with partners,
although trilateral cooperation may be seen as administratively burdensome for the coun-
tries studied, as most of them have significant national resources available.
Another challenge is cultivating an ‘international civil service’ culture at the domestic level
(beyond the foreign and defence ministry structures), so that the line ministries responsible
for identifying and releasing civilian experts see the value in doing so. In the cases of Russia
and Brazil for example, there exist significant barriers for individuals in civil service to take
up positions in international organizations. Such a culture would require built-in systems
to provide career, remunerative or other incentives (or at least eliminate the disincentives)
for the best individuals to deploy on overseas missions, responding to the concerns of the
individuals deploying and their releasing managers. Systems are also needed to help ensure
that the best-qualified personnel are deployed. The credibility of national CIVCAP contri-
butions, and the political risks that can go with poor performance on the international
stage, will place a premium on identifying good candidates and ensuring monitoring of how
they perform. This has been a continuing challenge for all countries involved in deploying
large numbers of personnel abroad; in particular it has been a constraint as regards the over-
all numbers of civil service personnel that can be deployed by many countries.
At present, in several countries there appears to be a disconnect between the political com-
mitment to CIVCAP at the global level and the investment required in national systems to
put CIVCAP into practice. This may indicate that future contributions will initially be
small, and that the upscaling of CIVCAP contributions may be quite slow, characterized by
trial-and-error approaches when new challenges are encountered. However, experience has
also shown that a country can respond to the challenges of providing larger contributions
of personnel in post-conflict settings in a relatively short time. In Turkey, for example, rapid
strides were made for supporting their larger-scale Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)
contributions in Afghanistan. Such measures to support longer-term CIVCAP deployment
could include more robust coordination, mobilization, pre-deployment preparation, hand-
over and debriefing processes, as well as an in-country managerial framework. As countries
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transition from ad hoc deployments for short missions to the provision of longer-duration
tours of duty and multiple rotation deployments, there comes a need for systems to sustain
a systematic deployment schedule of well-prepared personnel who are supported for func-
tioning under operationally challenging conditions.
CIVCAP and managing risk
The risk tolerance of most countries for deploying civilians in high-risk locations is as yet
unclear. Nonetheless, India and Turkey have engaged personnel in high-risk settings such
as Afghanistan and Somalia, and others have engaged in potentially insecure settings, as
with South Africa’s support to elections in the DRC, or Brazilian health officials working
in post-earthquake Haiti. The official deployment of personnel into insecure or difficult
settings can give rise to a range of political and ‘duty of care’-related risks. While true for
military deployments too, civilian deployments appear to accentuate the political risk cal-
culus. Harm to personnel can put at risk popular support for such endeavours, and call into
question the government’s decisions to deploy civilians. It can also undermine the effective-
ness of the programme. Similarly, poor discipline or poor professional performance on the
part of deployed personnel can entail reputational risk for the country deploying the sup-
port. Providing personnel through international organizations can mitigate against some of
these risks, or at least help government efforts to explain or defend decisions to deploy. In
addition, international entities may be willing to assume some administrative, logistical
support and security management burdens for deployed personnel.39 Assurances about bur-
den-sharing or support to managing administrative challenges and other risks are potential
factors that may influence decision-making around civilian deployments.
CIVCAP synergies between military and civilian deployments
Experience from international peace operations is another foundation stone that has
informed national thinking and decisions about deploying national capacities in peace-
building contexts. There may be a potential for leveraging national peacekeeping experi-
ences into the provision of civilian capacities in or alongside peace missions. Many of the
UN missions in which these personnel serve are multidimensional in mandate and multi-
functional in nature, with significant civilian tasks in their mandates. This presents oppor-
tunities, in principle, for these countries to provide civilian government-provided personnel
in addition to their extant military and police deployments within the same country and
deploying institution.40 To take one example, Brazil has military and/or police personnel
deployed in 14 UN field missions (peacekeeping operations or special political missions).
From among those same countries, Brazil also has active, albeit small-scale, cooperation
activities in nine: Afghanistan, the DRC, Guinea Bissau, Haiti, Lebanon, Liberia, South
Sudan, Syria and Timor-Leste. In principle, these could be countries where the UN and
Brazil might explore whether civilian government-provided personnel from Brazil could
39. For example, by including personnel in the UN Security Plan, or provision of office space, access to facilities, or even in
some cases access to the full logistical support infrastructure of a deployed organization, and the extension of certain
privileges and immunities for ‘experts on mission’.
40. For example in Timor Leste during the UNTAET mission (2000–2003) Portugal and Australia provided military and
police personnel but also civilian teams in technical assistance roles ranging from budget management to postal admin-
istration and port management, to translators and interpreters. Malaysia too was a significant source of translation and
interpretation services contracted by the mission in addition to its uniformed police and military deployments.
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address some of the important functions that the UN has been unable to fill through its
normal recruitment process. In addition, there may be additional opportunities at the
national level for identifying synergies by combining pre-deployment trainings, briefings
and debriefings amongst the military, police and civilian personnel deploying to the same
UN missions or to the same countries.
Regional organizations
Most of the partner countries in the CIVCAP Network do not operate in a setting where a
regional organization plays a significant role in deploying civilian capacity to crisis or post-
conflict settings. Turkey has provided civilian personnel to EU-led missions in the Bal-
kans41 and PRT contributions to NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).
South Africa is a strong supporter of both the African Union and SADC but it has not yet
deployed CIVCAP-type support via these organizations. To date, South Africa’s CIVCAP
engagement with SADC and the AU has focused on policy development, participating in
training and contributing civilian personnel to peacekeeping exercises. The AU, like the
UN, currently hires most of its civilian staff for its missions through direct recruitment
rather than sourcing government-provided civilian personnel from member states. These
limited experiences reveal no discernible current trend towards significant CIVCAP provi-
sion through regional organizations. Along with the European Union, the African Union
remains well ahead of other regional organizations in developing a civilian dimension to its
operations going as far as developing a roster for civilian capacities.42 Recent initiatives such
as the AU’s African Solidarity Initiative – a combination of capacity-building, in-kind shar-
ing of expertise, approaches and best practices, training, and funding support for peace-
building efforts in Africa – suggests that regional organizations may look beyond deploying
civilian personnel to assist countries emerging from conflict.43 Although it is possible that
the Organization of American States or Association of Southeast Asian Nations (which is
currently exploring options regarding regional peace operations models44) or other regional/
sub-regional entities might wish to mount future civilian operations, there are no indica-
tions of such developments in the short term. As and when regional organizations better
organize their own CIVCAP approach and capabilities, there may be a potential for com-
petition between these entities and global institutions such as the UN. As yet, however, such
competition cannot be expected at the operational level.45
41. Turkey has deployed policing experts as well as a judge in support of the EULEX mission in Kosovo.
42. See for example the AU Standby Force civilian dimension website: http://civilian.peaceau.org/index.php?option
=com_content&view=article&id=46&catid=34&Itemid=1
43. A summary of the ASI initiative is available at http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/auc-summary-asi-04-07-2012.pdf
44. For example, as a follow up to the Hanoi Plan of Action, the ASEAN Regional Forum is undertaking research on lessons
learned and best practices on regional peacekeeping operations, including civilian dimensions. However, it is unlikely
this will move rapidly toward a regional operational capacity.
45. The African Union has significant operational deployments underway, however, the number of civilians in these mis-
sions is relatively small – the AU has had approx. 50 civilians in each of its three peace-support operations missions to
date (Burundi, Darfur & Somalia), although the number of civilians in the AMISOM mission in Somalia may expand
to 150 in 2013.
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6. Baseline Findings and Observations
The CIVCAP Network’s baseline research on CIVCAP points to several areas of common
experience and common interest among the partner countries. This section aims to identify
general observations or ‘baseline’ (starting point) findings that emerge from this synthesis
report and the country case studies. It may be possible for the CIVCAP Network to track
some of these baseline findings over time, so as to monitor developments nationally and
internationally. The Network may also wish to react proactively to some of these early
observations to try to influence developments.
The following baseline findings are suggested for further discussion:
1. There is a good level of general support for CIVCAP among partners. The countries
studied are supportive partners of the CIVCAP process. In particular, they support its
emphasis on national capacity, the call for greater South–South engagement and the
efforts to provide an open and transparent approach to improving the quality of CIV-
CAP support to recipient countries, through bilateral cooperation and through interna-
tional organizations. However, whilst countries of the Global South provide approxi-
mately 60 per cent of all civilian personnel in UN peace operations, and approximately
80 per cent of all government-provided personnel to these missions, the low number of
civilian personnel they currently provide to UN peace operations stands in contrast with
their significant military and police contributions (see Annex 2).
2. CIVCAP needs to move from the theoretical to the practical, quickly. To sustain this
level of principled support, there must be concrete progress with CIVCAP in the com-
ing year and measurable results from tools such as CAPMATCH. Countries all noted
that until actionable requests for CIVCAP expertise are received, it remains unclear
exactly what is needed. Similarly, until it is made clear what level and nature of CIVCAP
support is needed on an ongoing basis, and under what arrangements government-pro-
vided personnel can be deployed, countries will not be in a position to calibrate their
systems to upscale CIVCAP deployments. This makes it difficult to assess the interest
in supporting actual CIVCAP deployments, and the capacity to do so, in the short term.
3. The UN CIVCAP concept is not sufficiently broad. The current definition and focus of
UN CIVCAP (on deploying specialist personnel) does not fully capture the extent of activ-
ities identified by CIVCAP Network countries when they describe their CIVCAP contri-
butions, which also include capacity support activities such as trainings, study tours, work-
shops, etc. The focus of UN CIVCAP on crisis-affected situations limits the ability to
reflect fully the larger-scale technical cooperation undertaken by these countries.
4. Countries are likely to remain ‘reactive’ with regard to UN CIVCAP deployments
until mechanisms are clearly articulated. Global South providers are likely to remain
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in a ‘reactive’ posture regarding deploying CIVCAP via multilateral channels. For the
UN’s overtures on CIVCAP to progress beyond initial dialogue with the Network part-
ners, the UN should ‘move first’ by elaborating specific mechanisms for bringing govern-
ment-provided personnel on board. There is otherwise a danger of priming the supply
side and raising expectations, without also preparing the demand side to better articulate
needs and to generate mechanisms to identify, request and deploy government-provided
personnel. When the onboarding modalities have been worked out, CIVCAP providers
will need to ensure that national offers of CIVCAP assistance are well-aligned to what is
needed. As shown by recent CAPMATCH experience, it can be expected that there will
be a period of confusion, with trial and error on all sides, and thus a need for a more pro-
active ‘guiding hand’ approach if new mechanisms are to take root.
5. Bilateral assistance is likely to remain the predominant approach. CIVCAP appears
to be understood primarily as a component of bilateral technical cooperation. As such,
CIVCAP is likely to be viewed – at least in the short to medium term – primarily through
the lens of bilateral, South–South cooperation. As with all countries providing interna-
tional cooperation activities, the countries studied here are likely to continue to prioritize
countries and situations on the basis of their own bilateral foreign policy interests. In the
short term, CIVCAP deployments seem more likely on a bilateral or trilateral coopera-
tion basis rather than through UN channels. There is potential scope for expanding the
interest in multilateral channels if external resources are made available and, more impor-
tantly, when a clearer framework for engagement can be developed by multilateral insti-
tutions. There is also scope for ensuring that bilateral and multilateral activities are better
coordinated with each other in support of shared peacebuilding objectives.
6. The CIVCAP community is small: strong formal as well as informal networks are
needed both internationally and domestically. National resources available for engag-
ing with CIVCAP are limited, so relations among the few individuals working on it are
very important. This places a continuing premium on establishing and maintaining the
small but strong network of relationships with the relevant individuals in countries that
support CIVCAP. These networks need to be established and maintained among the
national stakeholders of contributing countries, but also networks would be extremely
valuable among countries which support CIVCAP. In most countries, few domestic
stakeholders are aware of CIVCAP beyond the peak coordinating ministries/depart-
ments. As civilian capacity activities grow in each country, it will be important to expand
and sustain the network of domestic stakeholders who understand and can mobilize
capacities for CIVCAP. At the international level, the total global number of players
working on CIVCAP issues is low; networks to facilitate contact and cooperation among
them should be relatively simple, and could build on existing dialogues created in the
CIVCAP consultation and the development of the CAPMATCH tool.
7. Recognized need for strengthened coordination and deployment support systems,
but technocratic tools for managing larger scales of civilian capacity deployment are
not yet a high priority. The challenges of deploying and sustaining personnel in crisis
and post-conflict settings are considerable. Yet, on the whole there has been limited
focus on the administrative and logistical challenges as well as political and security man-
agement risks of deploying personnel in crisis and post-conflict settings. In countries
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more experienced in higher-risk deployments, there is a growing recognition of the need
for tools such as training, pre-deployment briefings, evaluation requirements etc., so as
to more effectively prepare personnel for work in sensitive political conditions and to
work with international partners. Where national cooperation programmes are scaling
up, it has been recognized that planning and coordination institutions may need to be
strengthened, in order to manage the increasing volume of requests but also to manage
domestic constituencies. However, tools for managing larger-scale civilian deployments
are unlikely to develop until there is a clearer understanding of the overall volume and
scope of demand for CIVCAP from the UN and others, and until the options for
deploying government-provided personnel through the UN and other multilateral
channels are better elaborated. As a result, some of the labour-and-resource intensive
work such as systematic national CIVCAP mapping, roster systems or standing training
and pre-deployment arrangements are unlikely to be initiated until the scale of actual
deployments can generate the political will to allocate the necessary resources.
8. New funding for encouraging CIVCAP through multilateral institutions could gen-
erate support from smaller countries with limited financial resources, but not from
the larger players. Financial resources for stimulating CIVCAP engagement through
multilateral channels may encourage the more interested but lesser-resourced countries
to participate. Funding sources such as through the UN Peacebuilding Fund (as is being
tested in Côte d’Ivoire) or trilateral cooperation may well continue to be necessary to
engage the wider Global South. However, countries with more significant domestic
resources (as in the case of many CIVCAP Network partners) are less driven by concerns
about the availability of external funding. Despite openness to multilateral channels for
deployment, they are likely to remain more interested in the delivery of civilian assis-
tance through bilateral modalities.
9. Trilateral cooperation arrangements are potentially important mechanisms for
building CIVCAP relationships, but they have been ad hoc. Trilateral cooperation
arrangements in support of CIVCAP appear to be ad hoc. The interest in creating CIV-
CAP ‘matches’ at the level of Permanent Missions in New York and at UN agency head-
quarters has not necessarily filtered down to national cooperation agencies or UN coun-
try offices. CAPMATCH may become an important aspect of this initial CIVCAP
phase, but more proactive support for making triangular cooperation ‘matches’ will
probably be required.
10.Regional organizations are not yet playing a significant role in CIVCAP, although
the AU is making strides. As yet, regional organizations do not feature highly as signif-
icant partners for CIVCAP Network partners in the short term. This is in part because
only the African Union is working to deploy significant operational capacity in this area,
while the other partners do not have similarly active regional players to engage with. The
AU is developing structures for civilian peace operations like the emerging African Sta-
bility Initiative, which will provide a stronger framework to engage with. Experiences
like the UNDP-supported IGAD programme in South Sudan demonstrate the potential
for regional and sub-regional entities to help mobilize CIVCAP resources, but could also
be a source of competition for the same pool of civilian capacities.
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ANNEX 1: Civilian Personnel in 
UN Field Missions
Source: UN DFS Data 2012
Top 20 Nationalities of International Civilian 
Personnel in PKOs and SPMs (August 2012)
Rank Nationality Total
1 USA 382
2 Kenya 340
3 Philippines 265
4 India 232
5 UK 215
6 Canada 207
7 Sierra Leone 202
8 Ghana 195
9 Serbia 162
10 Nigeria 158
11 Ethiopia 154
12 France 135
13 Pakistan 130
14 Uganda 128
15 Cameroon 111
16 Tanzania 109
17 Lebanon 98
17 Côte d'Ivoire 98
19 Rwanda 96
20 Russia 94
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Source: UN DPKO data, September 2012
Government-provided ‘Experts on Mission’ in the Justice Sector in UN peacekeeping
operations (September 2012)
Contributing country
Mission
TotalUNMISS MONUSCO UNAMID
Benin  6  6
Burkina Faso 1 1 1 3
Canada  1  1
Côte d’Ivoire  2  2
Ghana  1  1
Kenya  2  2
Madagascar  1  1
Mali  2  2
Nepal 1 1  2
Nigeria  1  1
Norway 1   1
Pakistan  1  1
Switzerland  1  1
Togo  1  1
Trinidad and Tobago   1 1
Tunisia  1  1
USA  1  1
Zimbabwe 2   2
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Source: UN DPKO data, September 2012
Government-provided ‘Experts on Mission’ (Corrections Personnel) in 
UN peacekeeping operations (September 2012)
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Benin 1 1
Belgium 1 1
Brazil
Burkina Faso 22 18 7 1 48
Cameroon 2 13 15
Canada 16 16
Germany 1 1
Ghana 20 7 10 4 41
Fiji 3 3
Italy
Jordan 1 1 2
Kenya 10 3 7 3 23
Madagascar 4 2 1 7
Mozambique
Namibia 3 1 4
Netherlands 1 1
Nigeria 12 1 1 3 17
Pakistan 1 1
Philippines 2 2
Portugal
Rwanda 10 3 2 1 16
Senegal 21 14 7 1 43
Sierra Leone 4 4
Sweden 6 2 3 11
Tanzania 3 4 7
Uganda 5 1 6
USA 5 1 6
Zambia 8 2 2 12
Zimbabwe 10 1 5 3 19
80 91 50 31 30 22 2 1 307
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ANNEX 2: Civilian, Military and Police Personnel Deployed by CIVCAP Network Partners (2010–2012)
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